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CAPITOL RECORDS, INC. V. THOMAS
2008 WL 4405282 (D.MINN. SEPT. 24, 2008)
I. INTRODUCTION
In a case involving alleged copyright infringement by a woman
using a peer-to-peer file sharing application, the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota considered whether it
should grant a new trial because it gave the jury an incorrect
instruction of the law.1 Plaintiffs, Capitol Records, Sony BMG
Music Entertainment, Arista Records, Interscope Records, Warner
Brothers Records, and UMG Recordings ("the recording
companies" or "the companies"), are recording companies who
filed a complaint alleging that the defendant, Jammie Thomas
("Thomas"), infringed twenty-four of their copyrighted materials
by making them available for download on the peer-to-peer file
sharing application, Kazaa.2 The court decided to grant Thomas a
new trial.3
II. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Background
Section 106(3) of the Copyright Act provides that "the owner of
the copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following: ... (3) to distribute copies of
1. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212 (D. Minn.
2008). Also before the court was defendant's motion for a new trial, or in the
alternative, remittitur. Defendant asserted that the award of statutory damages
was excessive and in violation of the due process clause of the U.S.
Constitution. Additionally before the court was plaintiff's motion to amend
judgment. Plaintiffs requested an injunction to stop the defendant from further
infringement and requesting that she destroy her copies of the infringing
material. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1228.
1
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phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending."4
However, "the Act does not define the term 'distribute,"' and
courts disagree as to whether making copyrighted works available
for distribution, without more, constitutes distribution.'
B. Factual Background
Plaintiffs are recording companies that owned or controlled
exclusive copyrights to the twenty-four sound recordings at issue
in this case.6 Defendant, Jammie Thomas, is a single mother who
allegedly downloaded songs from Kazaa, a peer-to-peer file
sharing network, and made them available in a public folder to
share with other Kazaa users.7 An investigator for the recording
companies downloaded the songs from Thomas's computer using
Kazaa, and the companies filed a complaint against her, alleging
that she infringed their copyrighted sound recordings pursuant to
the Copyright Act.8
During the trial, the recording companies submitted a proposed
jury instruction regarding the definition of distribution under the
Copyright Act, and the court, over Thomas's objection, included it
in the final jury instructions.9 The instruction read, "The act of
making copyrighted sound recordings available for electronic
distribution on a peer-to-peer network, without license from the
copyright owners, violates the copyright owners' exclusive right of
distribution, regardless of whether actual distribution has been
shown."' The jury found that Thomas had infringed all twenty-
four of the copyrights and awarded the recording companies
statutory damages of $9,250 per song, totaling $222,000."
4. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006).
5. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
6. Id. at 1212.
7. See id. at 1227.
8. See id. at 1212, 1214-15. Specifically, the recording companies alleged
that Thomas violated 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106, 501-05 (2006). Id. at 1213.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1213.
11. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1213.
188
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C. Procedural History
After the judgment, Thomas filed a Motion for New Trial, or in
the alternative, for Remittitur, on the issue of the constitutionality
of the statutory damage award.'2 The recording companies then
filed a Motion to Amend Judgment, requesting an injunction
requiring Thomas to destroy all illegal copies of their copyrighted
sound recordings in her possession and barring her from further
infringement. 3 Seven months later, the court issued an order
stating that it was contemplating granting a new trial on the ground
that it erred by giving the jury an improper instruction. 4
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Standard for Motion for a New Trial
The court explained that "[a]fter giving the parties notice and an
opportunity to be heard, the court may grant a timely motion for a
new trial for a reason not stated in the motion."' 5 Thomas filed a
motion for a new trial, and the court gave the parties notice of the
possible alternative grounds for a new trial.'6 Both parties and
Amici briefed the jury instruction issue and the court heard oral
argument. "7
The court has the power to grant a new trial on alternative
grounds when a legal error at trial results in a miscarriage of
justice."' The court quoted an Eighth Circuit case that explained,
"[i]n reviewing a substantive challenge to jury instructions, the
pertinent query is whether the instructions, taken as a whole and
viewed in light of the evidence and applicable law, fairly and
adequately submitted the issues in the case to the jury."' 9
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. The court also ordered the parties to brief this issue and granted
permission for five parties to file amicus briefs. Id.
15. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 59(d)).
16. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1213.
17. Id.
18. !dat 1214..
19. Id. (quoting Horstmyer v. Black & Decker, (U.S.), Inc., 151 F.3d 765,
2008] 189
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B. Prejudicial Effect of Any Error of Law
1. Standard
Thomas asserted that if the instruction was in error, the court
must grant her a new trial because the Special Verdict Form did
not specify why the jurors found her guilty of infringement, and it
may have been because they believed she only made the songs
available without actually distributing them.2" The recording
companies asserted that even if the instruction was in error, the
court should still not grant Thomas a new trial because it had no
effect on the jury.21 They asserted that Thomas violated their
reproduction right and that they proved their agent in fact
downloaded songs from Thomas.22
A court will reverse a jury verdict only when the erroneous
instruction affected a party's substantial rights, in that it misled the
jury or had a probable effect on its verdict.23 A judgment must be
reversed when a court is unable to know whether the jury based its
verdict on an impermissible ground.24
2. Reproduction Right
The recording companies asserted that even an erroneous
instruction did not mislead the jury because they proved that
Thomas violated their reproduction right, on which the jury was
correctly instructed.25 However, because the Special Verdict Form
did not specify on which ground the jury based its decision, there
was no way to know whether, even if the jury did find Thomas
guilty on the reproduction right grounds, its high statutory damage
award would have been the same.26
771 (8th Cir. 1998)).
20. Id..
21. Id.
22. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1214..
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
4
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3. Distribution to MediaSentry
The recording companies argued that even if establishing a
violation of the distribution right required actual dissemination, a
new trial should still not be granted because they established at
trial that Thomas actually disseminated songs to their investigator,
MediaSentry.27 Thomas argued that a copyright owner cannot
violate his own copyright, so a violation can only be established
when the copyrighted material is distributed to someone other than
the owner or his agent.28
While it is well established that a copyright owner cannot
infringe his own copyright, the Eighth Circuit has held that an
infringer will still be liable when he distributes copyrighted
material to the copyright owner's investigator without
authorization. 9
The recording companies further argued that even if distribution
required Thomas' active involvement, the acts of willfully
reproducing copyrighted material and placing it in a shared folder
for all to download from a network dedicated to illegal
downloading met that requirement." Thomas argued that her case
was unique because, while in the precedential cases, the infringers
actually aided in the distribution by helping the investigators make
copies, here the investigators downloaded the songs on their own
without her assistance."
Thomas cited an Eighth Circuit case that held the infringers
liable because they physically assisted the investigators in copying
an entire tape, rather than simply providing a blank tape and
demonstrating how to make a copy.32 Thomas argued that her case
was distinguishable because the investigators simply downloaded
the songs from her computer, without ever having met or heard of
her.33
27. Id.
28. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1214.
29. Id. at 1214-15 (citing Olan Mills, Inc. v. Linn Photo Co., 23 F.3d 1345,
1348 (8th Cir. 1994)).
30. Id. at 1215.
31. See id.
32. Id. Specifically, Thomas cited to RCA/Ariola International Inc. v.
Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1988).
33. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
2008]
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The court held that Eighth Circuit precedent is clear in allowing
distribution to an investigator to form the basis for an infringement
claim."4 It explained that while Thomas did not physically assist
the investigators in copying the songs as in the precedent cases,
she did aid them in a different and substantial way.3 It reasoned
that when Thomas copied the songs and placed them on a network
designed for easy, unauthorized copying, she actually assisted
more substantially than the infringers in the precedent cases who
merely assisted in making copies of works the investigators
provided. 6 However, because it was impossible to know if the
jury based its conclusion on the erroneous instruction or how it
affected its damage award, the court would still grant a new trial if
it found the instruction to be in error.37
C. Plain Meaning of the Term Distribution
Both parties argued that the plain meaning of the statute, which
presumptively expresses congressional intent, was in their favor.38
Thomas argued that the plain language of the statute showed that
distribution required transferring possession or ownership to
another person, rather than simply making it available to another. "
The record companies argued that the plain meaning showed that
merely making the work available was enough.4"
1. Statutory Language
The court first looked at the language of 17 U.S.C. § 106(3),
which states how distribution can be performed, but which does
not state that a mere offer to do these acts constitutes distribution.41
It decided that an initial reading of the statute supported Thomas's
argument.42
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
40. Id. at 1217.
41. Id.
42. Id.
6
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2. Secondary Sources
The court explored the definition of distribution in both a
dictionary and leading copyright treatises, and found that both
supported Thomas's interpretation that an actual transfer was
required.43
3. Opinion of the Register of Copyrights
The Register of Copyrights, in an opinion letter to Congress,
expressed her belief that making a work available is enough to
violate the distribution right, but the court said these letters were
only persuasive rather than binding.44
4. Use of the Term in Other Provisions of the U.S. Code
In some provisions of the Copyright Act not at issue here,
Congress explicitly defined distribution as including both the
actual transfer and making the work available, while in others it
was defined as only a physical transfer to another.45 The court
noted that because Congress made its intent to include making a
work available clear in other provisions of the Act, but did not do
so here, it indicated its decision not to include making a work
available for distribution in its definition of distribution in this
instance.46
The recording companies argued that in a separate title of the
U.S. Code addressing criminal child pornography distribution,
courts have interpreted the term distribute to include placing the
material in shared folders available for download on a peer-to-peer
network.47 The court explained, however, that this case was
distinguishable from a criminal context because there are penalties
43. See id. at *6
44. Id (citing Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Roger Miller Music, Inc., 396 F.3d
762, 778 (6th Cir. 2005))..
45. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1217; see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§
901(a)(4), 506(a)(1)(C), 115(c)(2).
46. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1218.
47. Id. at 1218 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (a)(2) (2006); United States v.
Shaffer, 472 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2007)).
2008]
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for attempted crimes, but not for attempting to violate the
Copyright Act, and because, in the criminal case, the violator knew
others had downloaded the pornography from his computer.48
Additionally, the court found that the Copyright Act and criminal
law were unrelated and decided that the criminal law interpretation
should not carry weight. 4"
The court also looked at the fact that Congress had added "offers
to sell" to the Patent Act, a related field, but had not added "offer
to distribute" to the Copyright Act." Prior to the changed
language, courts had interpreted the definition narrowly, not
including offers to sell in the definition." It explained that this
information demonstrated two principles with regard to court and
congressional intent: First, without a statutory definition, courts
were likely to narrowly interpret liability to not include offers to
sell. 2 Second, Congress can and will amend a statute when
necessary to include liability for an offer to commit an act.
The court concluded that based on the use of the term
"distribution" in other parts of the Copyright Act and in the Patent
Act, Congress did not intend to include offers to distribute in its
definition of "distribution. 54
E. Whether "Distribution" is Synonymous with "Publication"
The recording companies next argued that the term
"distribution" was synonymous with the term "publication," which
is defined in the Act to include both "distribution" and "offering to
distribute. 55  Under that definition, making songs available for
download on Kazaa could be considered distribution. 6
The first sentence of the definition of publication is nearly
identical to the language of the distribution right. 7 However, the
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)).
51. Id.
52. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1218.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1219.
56. Id.
57. Id. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 101(2006) (defining publication to be "the
194
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definition of publication continues on to include more than the
distribution right does. 8 The recording companies argued that the
additional language should also apply to the definition of
distribution.59 They reasoned that in some parts of the legislative
history of the Act, members of Congress used the words
"distribution" and "publication" interchangeably.6" The court,
however, decided that this bit of legislative history was
unconvincing; noting that even if some members of Congress
believed the words carried the same meaning, that could not
override the plain meaning of the statute.6
Amici argued that the Supreme Court has held that the
distribution right of § 106(3) includes the right of publication
defined in § 101.62 It explained that in its opinion, the Court
quoted a Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary that
called the distribution clause of § 106(3) a right of publication.6 3
However, elsewhere in the opinion, the Court referred to the rights
of publication and distribution as distinct from one another, so the
district court decided that the Supreme Court did not actually hold
that the two rights were synonymous.'
The court also noted that the Copyright Act as a whole
demonstrated that the two concepts were distinct, as the right of
publication carries with it certain duties that are not required for
the right of distribution. 65 The court concluded that just "because
all distributions within the meaning of § 106(3) are publications
does not mean that all publications . are distributions. 66 The
distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending") with 17 U.S.C. § 106
(2006) (stating that "the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
rights to do and to authorize any of the following: ... (3) to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending").
58. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1219.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539
(1985)).
63. Id.
64. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1220.
65. Id.
66. Id.
20081
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definition of publication is broader than that of distribution.67 The
fact that Congress used both words in the statute shows its intent
that the two words have distinct meanings.68
F. Existence of a Protected Right to Authorize Distribution
The recording companies next argued that the statute gives the
copyright owner an exclusive right to authorize distribution and
actual distribution, so that the act of making the recordings
available for download violated their right to authorize
distribution, even if the songs were never downloaded.69
However, the court concluded that this statutory language merely
provided a basis for secondary liability rather than another avenue
for direct liability. 7 Settled case law does not hold that merely
encouraging a party to infringe, without that party actually
infringing, provides a basis for liability, and equating distribution
with making available for distribution would undermine that law.71
Additionally, the recording companies argued that another
Supreme Court case demonstrated the existence of a separate right
to authorize distribution when it stated that print publishers
violated the authors' rights to authorize distribution by placing
articles in electronic databases and aiding the electronic publishers
in doing so.7 However, the court concluded that this excerpt of
the opinion was taken out of context, and that the opinion as a
whole dispels that interpretation.7 ' The Court actually meant that
the print publisher's act of copying was at issue, not its
distribution.74
The court concluded that case law, the text of the statute, and
legislative history indicated that the authorization right is merely a
means of establishing secondary liability rather than direct
liability. 75
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 1220-21.
70. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1221.
71. Id.
72. Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. Tansini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001)).
73. See id. at 1222.
74. Id. at 1223.
75. Id.
196
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G. Eighth Circuit Precedent: National Car Rental System, Inc. v.
Computer Associates International, Inc.
Although the Eighth Circuit had no opinions dealing directly
with the distribution of files over a peer-to-peer network, it did
rule on the making available argument.76 In National Car Rental
System, Inc. v. Computer Associates International, Inc., the court
addressed whether a licensing issue was preempted by the
Copyright Act." In order to answer the question, the court
rejected National Car Rental System, Inc.'s ("Defendant")
argument that Computer Associates International, Inc.'s
("Plaintiff') claim was essentially that Defendant unlawfully
distributed the functionality of the program, so the Copyright Act
preempted Plaintiffs claim since it dealt with a right equivalent to
one of the rights in copyright." In rejecting this argument, the
Eighth Circuit quoted Professor Nimmer as saying, "infringement
of the distribution right requires an actual dissemination of either
copies or phonorecords."79  It concluded that making programs
available for third party use did not constitute distribution."0
The court explained that this decision is binding law in the
Eighth Circuit, and the statement quoted above was not dictum
because it was an essential part of the reasoning behind the court's
holding.81 In addition, this interpretation was consistent with the
only reasonable interpretation of the statute. 2
However, Amici argued that even if the court follows National
Car Rental, it should still find unlawful distribution in this unique
case because peer-to-peer networks are specifically designed to
eliminate any evidence of actual distribution, making it difficult to
prove. 3 Amici cited the Fourth Circuit case of Hotaling v. Church
76. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1223.
77. Id. See Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 991 F.2d
426 (8th Cir. 1993).
78. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1223 (citing Nat'l Car Rental Sys.,
991 F.2d at 434).
79. Nat'l Car Rental Sys., 991 F.2d at 434 (quoting 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.11 [A] (2008).
80. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1223.
81. Id. at 1223-24.
82. Id. at 1224.
83. Id.
2008]
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of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints as the basis for this
argument. 4
H. Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Chris of Latter-Day Saints
The Hotaling case involved a library making unauthorized
works available to the public.85 The Fourth Circuit held that when
a library adds a work to its collection, lists it in its catalog system,
and makes the work available to the public, it has completed all the
steps necessary for distribution.86 If the court did not consider this
distribution, then libraries who did not keep records of public use
would unjustly profit. 87
The court here noted that the Fourth Circuit did not cite any
authority for its holding, but rather relied on equitable concerns to
make its decision.88 Some district courts, however, have used this
opinion to justify holding defendants liable who use peer-to-peer
networks to make unauthorized works available to the public.89
Amici analogized Hotaling to the present case, arguing that if the
court failed to consider making works available distribution, then
persons using peer-to-peer networks that eliminate evidence of
wrongdoing would be rewarded."
The court rejected Amici's argument in favor of following the
precedential National Car Rental decision because it was
consistent with the plain meaning of the statute, the legislative
history, and copyright case law.9" It noted, however, that its
decision did not mean that copyright holders have no remedy for
these acts.92 It stressed that the standards for evidence were not as
difficult to meet as Amici made them out to be, and that the
conduct still violates the copyright holder's reproduction right.93
84. Id. See Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d
199 (4th Cir. 1997).
85. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1224.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id..
89. Id.
90. See idat 1225..
91. See Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.
92. Id.
93. Id.
12
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The violators may also be liable for indirect infringement if their
acts caused others to commit acts of infringement.94
In addition, those who download the works may also be liable
for direct infringement, depending on the facts of the case and
applicability of defenses.95 Those who market products or services
that enable others to infringe may also be liable for indirect
infringement or for violating the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act.96 Also, direct proof of actual dissemination is not necessary
to establish a violation of the Copyright Act.97 Plaintiffs are free
to argue actual dissemination using circumstantial evidence.98
Thus, though making available is not a violation of the Copyright
Act, copyright holders will be able to hold peer-to-peer network
users liable for infringement."9
I Implications of International Law
1. U.S. Treaty Obligations Regarding the Making-Available Right
The United States has entered into several international treaties
involving copyrights that recognize a making-available right not
dependent on actual dissemination.' °° By ratifying and adopting
the treaties, the United States agreed to protect that right.'' The
United States has also entered into various Free Trade Agreements
that provide the same right. 02
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2), (b) (2006).
97. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. These treaties include the World Intellectual Property Organization
Copyright Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 152
and the World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997).
101. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.
102. Id.
2008]
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2. Charming-Betsy Doctrine
a. Introduction to the Doctrine
According to the Charming-Betsy doctrine, the United States
ordinarily construes any ambiguous statute to avoid interfering
with other sovereign nations' authority. Amici argued that the
court must adopt any reasonable interpretation of the Act that
allowed the United States to comply with its treaty obligations.'03
b. Application of the Doctrine to Non-Self-Executing
Treaties
The World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") treaties
are not self-executing, which means that they have no binding
authority except as implemented through the Copyright Act."
Thus, the making available right is not enforceable separately from
the Act."0 5 The only way it could be enforced is if the statute was
ambiguous and a reasonable interpretation aligned with the treaty
obligations. 106
c. Application of the Doctrine in this Case
The court acknowledged that past presidents, congresses, and
register of copyrights have indicated that they believe the
Copyright Act contains a make-available right in accordance with
WIPO. "7 It also recognized that the Charming-Betsy doctrine
indicates that ambiguous laws should be construed to be consistent
with the country's international obligations." 8 However, the court
found that in this case, the congressional intent was clear that
under § 106(3), simply making a work available without actual
103. Id. at 1226.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
108. Id.
200
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dissemination did not count as distribution. 109
J. Grant ofa New Trial
The court concluded that liability for violating the exclusive
distribution right of § 106(3) required actual dissemination."'
Therefore, the jury instruction was in error, and that error
substantially prejudiced Thomas's rights."' The court granted
Thomas a new trial.'' 2 It therefore did not reach Thomas's
excessive damages claim and denied the recording companies'
motion to amend judgment since the judgment was vacated." 3
K. Need for Congressional Action
The court then implored Congress to amend the Copyright Act
to deal with cases of liability and damages using peer-to-peer
networks."' It explained that in all of the cases cited by both
parties, the high statutory damage awards were granted against
commercial businesses infringing copyrights for commercial
gain. "' However, in this case, Thomas was an individual
consumer who infringed the copyrights not for any financial gain,
but for her own personal enjoyment. 16
The court explained that the statutory damage awards are not a
deterrent for those who pirate music for profit.' ' Though
Thomas's conduct was not appropriate, such high statutory
damages equate her actions with large businesses seeking gains of
hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars from their
infringement. "8 Even though collectively, illegal downloading
harms recording companies, the damages here were completely out
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1226-27.
112. Id. at 1227.
113. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1227.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
2008]
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of proportion with Thomas' actions. "' She infringed the
copyrights of twenty-four songs, the equivalent of three CDs.' 21
The damage award was more than four thousand times the cost of
three CDs.' 2 ' Even though statutory damages are meant to be
more than simply the actual damage caused by the defendant, the
court believed that damages of more than one hundred times the
injury would be a sufficient deterrent. 2 2  Thomas acted like
countless others in downloading music from a peer-to-peer
network simply to enjoy the music.'23 Though her behavior is not
excusable, damages of hundreds of thousands of dollars for her
behavior are unprecedented and oppressive. 24
IV. CONCLUSION
The court vacated the verdict rendered by the jury and remanded
the case for a new trial, and it vacated the judgment. 125 It also
granted Thomas's motion for a new trial and denied plaintiffs
motion to amend judgment. 126
-Megan Murphy
119. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1227.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Idat 1228.
124. Id.
125. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1228.
126. Id.
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